This week we began writing our policy paper and attempted to disentangle the mess that is the international presence in Kosovo. I will try my best to explain the situation, as it is quite interesting from the international law perspective as well as from the political one. Keep in mind, however, that the international organizations themselves are often unable to offer a suitable explanation for much of the confusion in Kosovo regarding their presence.



The United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is a mission established by Security Council Resolution 1244 that provides for its administrative presence in Kosovo. It is important to remember that it does not explicitly provide for Kosovo’s independence, which is why it is still supported by both Serbia and Russia. In 2007, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was appointed to initiate the process of determining Kosovo’s future status. After much (fruitless) negotiation with both Serbia and Kosovo, Ahtisaari created what is known as the Ahtisaari Package: a proposal that outlines the steps necessary to ensure Kosovo’s success as an independent state. The problem, however, was that Russia was not prepared to allow such a package to pass, and the Security Council failed to come to a consensus regarding its applicability. Technically it was illegal for Kosovo to declare its independence notwithstanding the UNMIK presence and the failure of the Ahtisaari Package to be implemented by the UN, as it did on February 17th 2008.

It was originally envisaged that an EU rule of law mission would take over from the UN mission in Kosovo, carrying out the necessary executive responsibilities. Since the Ahtisaari Package was never approved by the Security Council, this pass-over of responsibilities became less straightforward. Instead, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was deployed under the “UN umbrella”. In the North however, where there is a Serb majority, the UN continues to play a role in some administrative activities as it is the only organization that is formally accepted by the Serbs.



EULEX’s responsibilities concern the administration of courts, police, and customs in Kosovo. Their functioning under the UN umbrella essentially means that they derive their legal authority from the UN, and more specifically Resolution 1244. In order for Russia and Serbia to agree to EULEX deployment in December 2008, this rather confusing compromise was required. It should be noted that EULEX is “status-neutral”, meaning that while it is essentially engaged in state-building activities, it does not declare its support for Kosovo’s independence. EULEX is currently facing problems in its capacity to function in the North, particular at the border between Serbia and Kosovo. Kosovo-Serbs do not recognize the border between the two states as a legitimate border and thus do not accept the border-tax imposed by EULEX.

It should also be noted that the European Union Special Representative, Peter Feith, is also the International Civilian Representative (ICR) – the head of the International Civilian Office (ICO). The problem with this double role lies in the fact that the EU mission in Kosovo remains resolutely status-neutral, while the ICO’s mission is to further Kosovo’s capacity as a fully independent state through the implementation of the Ahtisaari Package. It is still unclear to me just how such an arrangement was made possible, or why, but it is demonstrative of the type of international political maneuvering that is so common in Kosovo.



As stated above, the ICO was charged in February 2008 by the International Steering Group (ISG) (a group created out of the blue when the Ahtisaari Package was not accepted by the Security Council and comprised of states that accepted Kosovo’s independence at the time) with the implementation of the Ahtisaari Package.

Legally speaking, there is no precedent for a document such as the Ahtisaari Package. It’s not quite a constitution, nor a resolution, but rather its status is defined by who is considering it . Part of our task while conducting our research was to objectively evaluate the force of this sui generis document, and the reality is that within the local institutions in Kosovo, it is given a great deal of importance. The Kosovo Constitution itself proclaims the Ahtisaari Package the supreme document in Kosovo, capable of trumping even the Constitution itself. The problem remains that international acceptance of its importance remains a politically contentious issue. And whether or not a governing document in a country is internationally accepted is crucial in a country that is still to a degree dependent on an international presence within the state.

As it stands, UNMIK continues to play a more active role in the North of Kosovo, as well as providing Kosovo with much needed international legitimacy that is required in order for a state to function and cooperate with neighbouring countries. There is much debate, however, over how crucial a role UNMIK actually plays relative to its considerable budget in Kosovo. EULEX has taken over rule of law responsibilities while remaining ineffective to a degree in the North and, confusingly, having to function under the UN umbrella (making a real hand-over of responsibility impossible). The ICO functions with a mandate that is not recognized by the other organizations, and struggles to remain relevant in the eyes of internationals, despite the great weight local institutions place on the Ahtisaari Package. UNMIK states that the only solution to the current legal and political situation in Kosovo is to broker a deal with Russia. However, effective local politics are also important when trying to solve many of the problems on the ground that are linked with what some may perceive as an overly-expansive international presence.

This is the situation that Kosovo currently finds itself in. It’s no surprise that many locals are beginning to resent the international presence in Kosovo, which is expensive and may well be counter-productive. Yet, the political situation does not allow for a Kosovo completely independent from any influence from international institutions. Rather the aim should be to improve the quality of governance and level of accountability and cooperation between institutions so as to accelerate the pace of Kosovo’s development.