As I introduced in my last post, the project we are doing for GAP Institute is about the role of international administrative organizations operating in Kosovo. I’m particularly interested in the role of the UN since they’ve been present for quite awhile and seem to have garnered mixed sentiments from the population and abroad. A bit of a history brief about the UN in Kosovo is necessary to explain the current situation.

After NATO intervention in 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under the authority of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). According to 1244, UNMIK was responsible for state-building activities such as performing basic civil administration, supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and supporting autonomy and self-government in Kosovo. Significantly, UNMIK was also charged with the task of facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

In 2005, six years after the passing of 1244, UNMIK finally began the process of determining Kosovo’s future status. Under UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, a document called the Ahtisaari Package was drafted. Without explicitly using the term independence, it indeed envisions it as the final status for Kosovo by proposing independent mechanisms such as a constitution, the right to conclude international agreements and the right to membership in international institutions. It also proposes a new interim international presence, the International Civilian Office (ICO), to supervise the political process, and for an EU mission to offer mentorship in rule of law, thereby calling for the termination of UNMIK’s mandate.

If everything had gone according to plan, the Ahtisaari Package would have entered into force and administrative capacities would have been handed over to local government, to be supervised by ICO and EULEX. However, upon the Package’s submission to the Security Council, Serbia’s ally, Russia, consistently blocked its passing. Thus the Ahtisaari Package has never been authorized by the Security Council and 1244 has never been revoked. Regardless of its lack of consensus, Kosovo went ahead with the propositions of the Ahtisaari Package and unilaterally declared independence in February 2008. The practical result we have today is that the ICO is present under the mandate of the Ahtisaari Package while UNMIK remains present as well under the mandate of 1244. It is an interesting situation in the field of public international law. It is unclear which legal document holds precedence, the answer to which surely changes depending on who you ask. Furthermore, this situation raises questions about the effect of international agreements versus the (arguably more effective) actions of the people on the ground. Although 1244 officially remains in force, local government pursues its own interests.

Local attitudes toward UNMIK these days are contentious and complex. On the one hand, UNMIK came in during a period of crisis and suffering and its humanitarian intervention is lauded. However, 10 years later, it seems that they have overstayed their welcome. First of all, UNMIK’s continued presence is regarded as an obstacle to substantive independence. As reported by UNSC Secretary General in his March 2009 Report on UNMIK, “[t]here is a perception among many Kosovo Albanians that the Mission’s tasks have been accomplished and its continued presence is an unwelcome obstacle to the desire for Kosovo to function as a sovereign state. The Kosovo authorities…have repeatedly stated…that resolution 1244 (1999) is no longer relevant and that institutions of Kosovo have no legal obligation to abide by it”.

One of the areas where this self-determined attitude greatly manifests itself is in Kosovo’s representation in international agreements, namely the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Since the agreement was signed in 2007, UNMIK signed on Kosovo’s behalf. Since its declaration of independence in 2008, however, Kosovo has attempted to represent itself; according to the Ahitsaari Package, the Kosovo authorities should assume the responsibilities of the international agreements that UNMIK has signed on its behalf. As such, Kosovo authorities modified trade stamps to read the Republic of Kosovo rather than UNMIK. However, some of the signatories to CEFTA, namely Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have not recognized Kosovo’s independence and have therefore boycotted the Kosovo-stamped products. In response, Kosovo authorities have boycotted CEFTA meetings. This situation reveals that despite local resistance, UNMIK may still be practically necessary in dealing with states that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. Another significant example is the Serbian minority population concentrated in Northern Kosovo who seem willing to co-operate and negotiate only with UNMIK forces rather than any other local or international institutions.

The article entitled UNMIKistan, written a couple of years ago by a former UNMIK official, highlights another reason for criticism of the organization: grave failures in state-building capacities. It reports how eight years and twenty-two billion euros after the mission had started, the black economy was thriving whereas the white one was about to collapse. Markets are filled with imports while local produce is scant. Although an agrarian country, the fields are fallow since UN courts failed to determine the fields’ ownership. It also reports on wide-scale corruption and abuse of financial resources amongst UN officials.

UNMIK has also been accused of several human rights abuses during its mission. According to Amnesty International, UN peacekeepers are responsible for fuelling the sex trade in the region as increasing numbers of women from Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania were trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo since the mission’s presence. UNMIK is also responsible for human rights abuses related to Kosovo’s minority Roma community. After the war, UNMIK relocated them to refugee camps that were situated amongst harmful lead mines, resulting in grave health risks. Although the WHO called for their immediate evacuation in 2004, many of the refugees still remain in these lead-contaminated camps. You can read more about it here and here.

Two former UNMIK officials have recently published a book entitled Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. It details more about the internal failures of UNMIK while also explaining the inherent challenges of humanitarian interventions. I haven’t read it yet but it should be an interesting read and a useful lesson for such missions in the future.